Two brothers spent about twenty years in jail, much of it on death row, before the Supreme Court of Pakistan acquitted them. Their case raises some of the hardest questions in Pakistani criminal law: what happens when a person accused of a serious offence is suffering from a mental illness, how courts should weigh conflicting medical evidence, and how long justice can take before it stops feeling like justice at all.
On 7 November 2026, a three-member bench of the Supreme Court led by Chief Justice Yahya Afridi set aside the convictions of Liaqat Ali and Umar Draz and acquitted both men. Justice Ishtiaq Ibrahim wrote the main judgment. Justice Shakeel Ahmad agreed with the acquittal and added a separate note of his own. The decision ended a case that had begun two decades earlier and had already passed through a trial court and the Lahore High Court.
This article explains, in plain language, what happened in the case, what Section 84 of the Pakistan Penal Code says about unsoundness of mind, how the medical evidence changed over the years, why the Supreme Court preferred the later medical boards, and what the acquittal does — and does not — change in the law. It also looks at what the ruling means for blasphemy trials and for death-row appeals more generally.
What happened: a case that lasted twenty years
Liaqat Ali and Umar Draz were convicted on 27 March 2006 by a sessions judge in Jhang under Section 295-C of the Pakistan Penal Code. Section 295-C deals with the use of derogatory remarks in respect of the Holy Prophet (peace be upon him), and it carries the death penalty. Each brother was sentenced to death and fined Rs500,000.
The brothers appealed. On 17 September 2015 — more than nine years after the conviction — the Lahore High Court upheld the death sentences. That meant the case then travelled to the Supreme Court, where it remained for roughly another decade before the final decision on 7 November 2026.
In other words, the timeline looked like this:
- 2006: Convicted by the sessions judge in Jhang within weeks of the case reaching trial, and sentenced to death.
- 2015: Lahore High Court upheld the death sentences.
- 2026: Supreme Court set aside the convictions and acquitted both men.
By the time of the acquittal, the two brothers had spent about twenty years in jail, much of it on death row. That length of time matters. It is not a legal argument on its own, but it frames everything else about the case: evidence grows old, memories fade, medical conditions change, and the people waiting for a decision grow older in prison while the appeals move slowly through the system.
Section 84 PPC: unsoundness of mind explained
To understand the Supreme Court's decision, it helps to understand Section 84 of the Pakistan Penal Code. The section deals with the defence of unsoundness of mind. In simple terms, it says that a person is not criminally responsible for an act if, at the time of doing it, he was incapable of knowing the nature of the act, or that what he was doing was either wrong or contrary to law, because of unsoundness of mind.
There are a few important points packed into that short explanation:
- The question is about the time of the offence. What matters is the person's mental state when the act was done, not only how he seems years later in court or in prison.
- The test is about capacity, not only diagnosis. Having a mental illness is not automatically enough. The court has to be satisfied that the illness left the person unable to understand what he was doing, or unable to understand that it was wrong or against the law.
- The burden is a difficult one. The defence must raise enough material for the court to have a reasonable doubt about the accused's capacity. The court then decides whether the benefit of doubt should go to the accused.
Section 84 is not a new idea, and it is not unique to Pakistan. Most legal systems accept that punishment only makes sense when a person could understand what he was doing and could choose differently. Where that understanding is absent because of a serious mental illness, the law treats the person differently from someone who acted with a clear mind.
That does not mean the person simply walks free without any consequence or care. In many cases the court can direct that the person be kept in safe custody or receive treatment. The point of Section 84 is about criminal responsibility, not about whether the act happened or whether the person needs help.
How the medical evidence evolved
The medical evidence in this case did not stay the same. It changed dramatically over the years, and that change was central to the Supreme Court's decision.
In 2007, a three-member board at DHQ Hospital Faisalabad found both men mentally sound. On its own, that finding supported the prosecution's position: the brothers were fit, they understood what they were doing, and the defence of unsoundness of mind did not apply.
But later examinations told a very different story. In 2023, an eight-member Board of Certification diagnosed both men with bipolar affective disorder with psychotic symptoms. Then, in September 2025, a nine-member board found both men suffering from bipolar disorder in a current manic episode. The board described the illness as a long-term condition, most likely permanent in acute cases, leaving the men without insight into their acts.
Two features of that later evidence stood out to the Supreme Court:
- Both brothers had the same diagnosis. The shared diagnosis was treated as compelling corroboration of an inherited, pre-existing illness, rather than a coincidence or a condition invented later.
- The later boards were larger and more specialist. The 2023 board had eight members and the 2025 board had nine, while the early board had only three members, with only one psychiatrist among them.
The court held that the unanimous view of the specialist boards carried more weight than the early board's finding. It also held that bipolar disorder, in the form found here, deprives a person of the capacity to comprehend the nature or lawfulness of their actions during active manic episodes. On that basis, the court concluded that the benefit of doubt could not be withheld from the accused.
Why the court preferred the later boards
Courts often have to choose between conflicting expert opinions. That is not unusual. What matters is the reasoning the court gives for preferring one view over another, and in this case the Supreme Court gave clear reasons.
First, there was the question of expertise. A board with only one psychiatrist is not the same as a board made up of specialists who examined the men together and reached a unanimous view. The Supreme Court treated the later boards as more reliable because they were larger, more specialised, and unanimous.
Second, there was the question of consistency. The later boards did not disagree with each other. The 2023 board and the 2025 board both found the same underlying condition — bipolar disorder — even though they examined the men two years apart. That consistency made the diagnosis harder to dismiss as a one-off error.
Third, there was the fact that both brothers were diagnosed with the same illness. Mental illness can run in families, and the court treated the shared diagnosis as corroboration that the illness was inherited and pre-existing, not something that appeared only after years in prison.
Fourth, there was the nature of the illness itself. Bipolar disorder is not a single, unchanging state. A person can have periods of stability and periods of acute illness, including manic episodes in which judgment, insight, and understanding are seriously affected. The 2025 board found the men in a current manic episode, and described the illness as long-term and most likely permanent in acute cases. The court connected that finding to the test in Section 84: during an active manic episode, a person may lack the capacity to comprehend the nature or lawfulness of his actions.
Taken together, those points created a reasonable doubt about whether the brothers had the necessary capacity at the relevant time. And in criminal law, where that kind of doubt exists on a central question, the benefit of that doubt goes to the accused.
Justice Shakeel Ahmad's additional note
Justice Shakeel Ahmad agreed with the acquittal, but he added a separate note that is important to understand. He cautioned that a psychiatric diagnosis on its own does not meet the test in Section 84 of the Pakistan Penal Code.
That caution matters for two reasons. It reminds lawyers and courts that a diagnosis is the starting point, not the end of the inquiry. A person can have a mental illness and still understand what he is doing. The court must still ask the harder question: did the illness, at the time of the act, actually deprive this person of the capacity to know what he was doing, or that it was wrong or against the law?
It also guards against a misunderstanding of the main judgment. The acquittal in this case was not a ruling that every person diagnosed with bipolar disorder is automatically covered by Section 84. It was a ruling on these facts, on this evidence, where the boards were unanimous, the diagnosis was shared by both brothers, and the illness was found to remove insight and understanding during active manic episodes. Future cases will still need to prove the link between the diagnosis and the person's capacity at the time of the offence.
What the acquittal does and does not change
It is easy to over-read a single judgment, so it is worth being clear about what this decision does and does not do.
What it does:
- It acquits Liaqat Ali and Umar Draz and ends their convictions and death sentences.
- It confirms that courts should give serious weight to unanimous specialist medical boards, particularly where an early assessment was made by a smaller and less specialised body.
- It confirms that the shared diagnosis of a heritable illness in close relatives can corroborate that the illness was pre-existing.
- It confirms that, where the evidence raises a genuine doubt about capacity under Section 84, the benefit of doubt must go to the accused.
What it does not do:
- It does not change the text of Section 295-C, and it does not change the punishment that section provides.
- It does not create a general rule that a mental illness diagnosis automatically leads to acquittal. As Justice Ahmad's note makes clear, the Section 84 test still has to be met on the facts of each case.
- It does not decide that every blasphemy conviction is unsafe. It decides this case, on this evidence, where the medical record was unusually strong and consistent.
- It does not remove the need for proper investigation, fair trial, and careful appellate review in blasphemy cases. If anything, it underlines how important those safeguards are.
The court also asked the Punjab Institute of Mental Health to ensure that the men's medical treatment continues. That direction is significant. Acquittal ends the criminal case, but it does not end the illness. The court's concern for continuing treatment shows that the case was not only about punishment, but also about care for two men who have been found to suffer from a serious, long-term mental health condition.
What it means for blasphemy trials
Blasphemy cases in Pakistan are among the most sensitive and difficult cases in the criminal justice system. They carry the most severe punishment, they attract intense public attention, and they place enormous pressure on everyone involved — complainants, accused persons, witnesses, lawyers, and judges.
This judgment does not change the law of blasphemy, but it does carry lessons for how such cases should be handled:
- Mental health must be examined early and properly. Where there is any sign that an accused person may be suffering from a mental illness, the examination should be thorough, specialist-led, and repeated if necessary. A single early assessment by a small board is not enough when the stakes are this high.
- Expert evidence must be tested, not assumed. Courts should look at who examined the accused, how many specialists were involved, whether they agreed, and whether the findings were consistent over time.
- The Section 84 question must be asked directly. It is not enough to note a diagnosis in passing. The court must ask whether the illness affected the person's capacity at the time of the act.
- Fair trial safeguards matter more, not less, in sensitive cases. The more serious the charge and the punishment, the more careful the process must be. That includes the investigation, the trial, and the appeals.
None of this is easy in practice. In blasphemy cases, there is often pressure to move quickly, and there can be fear around taking a careful, questioning approach. But the Supreme Court's judgment is a reminder that speed is not a substitute for accuracy, and that a conviction reached quickly can still take twenty years to correct.
What it means for death-row appeals
The case also says something important about death-row appeals in general. The brothers were convicted within weeks in 2006. It then took about a decade for the Lahore High Court to decide the appeal, and about another decade for the Supreme Court to decide the case finally. That is roughly twenty years from conviction to acquittal.
Long delays in death-row appeals are not new in Pakistan, and they are not limited to this case. But this case shows the human cost of delay in a particularly stark way. Two men spent about twenty years in jail, much of it under sentence of death, before a court concluded that they should not have been convicted at all. No later judgment can give those years back.
The delay also affects the quality of justice itself. Medical evidence can change, witnesses can become unavailable, and records can become harder to assess. In this case, the later medical boards were able to examine the men in 2023 and 2025 and reach a clear view. In other cases, delay can mean that important evidence is lost altogether.
There is no single fix for appellate delay, and this judgment does not pretend to offer one. But it is a reminder that the appeal process is not a formality. It is the last protection for a person who has been sentenced to death, and it must work in a reasonable time if it is to mean anything.
The human side of the case
Behind the legal principles, there is a human story that should not be lost. Two brothers were convicted and sentenced to death when the case moved quickly in 2006. They then waited in prison while the appeals moved slowly. During that time, their mental health was examined, re-examined, and eventually found to be seriously impaired by a long-term illness.
The Supreme Court's decision does not undo what happened in those twenty years. It acquits them, and it directs that their treatment should continue. But the case is also a reminder of how much depends on getting the first decisions right — the investigation, the medical examination, the trial, and the first appeal. When those decisions are wrong, the correction can take decades.
For families of accused persons, the lesson is that medical evidence matters and should be pursued properly, with specialist help, from the earliest stage. For lawyers, the lesson is that Section 84 is not a technical side issue, but a central question that can decide a case. For courts, the lesson is that expert evidence must be weighed carefully, and that a later, fuller, and more specialist assessment can be more reliable than an early and limited one.
Conclusion
The Supreme Court's acquittal of Liaqat Ali and Umar Draz is a significant decision, but it is a narrow one. It rests on specific facts: a shared diagnosis of bipolar disorder with psychotic symptoms, unanimous findings by large specialist boards, a condition found to remove insight and understanding during active manic episodes, and a reasonable doubt about capacity under Section 84 of the Pakistan Penal Code.
It does not rewrite the law of blasphemy, and it does not mean that every mental health diagnosis will lead to an acquittal. What it does do is show how Section 84 should work in practice: the court must look at the whole medical record, prefer the most reliable expert evidence, and give the benefit of doubt to the accused where that doubt is genuine.
It also leaves a wider question that the judgment cannot answer on its own: how to make sure that cases like this do not take twenty years to reach a final decision. Until that question is addressed, the risk remains that other people will spend years on death row before a court concludes that they should not have been convicted in the first place.
This article is general legal information about a court decision and the law discussed in it. It is not legal advice for any specific case, and anyone facing a criminal charge or an appeal should seek advice from a qualified lawyer about their own circumstances.
