"A marriage may be dissolved by a court, but neither spouse should be judicially deprived of a lawful right, nor judicially burdened with a stigma, without the foundation of law and evidence."

That sentence, from the Supreme Court of Pakistan's 2026 judgment in Mst. Zainab Bibi v. Muhammad Waseem and others, captures the whole case in one line. A court can end a marriage. But it cannot take away a right that the law gives to a spouse, or attach a label to a spouse, without law and evidence to support it. That principle decided two wives' cases, changed how courts should treat a broken marriage where cruelty cannot be proved, and clarified a distinction that matters enormously in practice: the difference between khula and dissolution under the Dissolution of Muslim Marriages Act, 1939.

The case is reported as 2026 SCP 313, arising from C.P.L.A. No. 57 of 2025 and C.P.L.A. No. 1350 of 2025. It was decided by a five-member bench. Justice Shahid Waheed wrote the judgment, sitting with Justices Naeem Akhter Afghan, Muhammad Hashim Khan Kakar, Ishtiaq Ibrahim, and Miangul Hassan Aurangzeb. The size of the bench alone signals that the Court regarded the questions as important and in need of authoritative settlement.

This article explains the ruling in plain language: what khula and statutory dissolution are, what shiqaq means, what section 2(ix) of the 1939 Act covers, why the dower consequence matters so much, what proof a wife still needs, how the Family Court procedure works, and what the decision means in practical terms for wives and husbands. It is general information about a reported judgment, not advice for any specific marriage.

The background: two marriages that could not be saved

The case concerned two wives, each of whom had filed a suit for dissolution of marriage in the Family Court. Each wife sued on the ground of cruelty, and each also claimed maintenance, dower (haq mehr), and dowry articles. Those are common claims in such suits: the wife asks the court to end the marriage, to order maintenance for the period she is entitled to it, to enforce payment of dower, and to return the articles she brought to the marriage.

In each case, the Family Court examined the evidence and found that cruelty had not been proved. That is a crucial fact. In many people's minds, if cruelty is not proved, the case must fail and the wife must remain married. But the Family Courts in these cases took a different path. They found that reconciliation between the parties had failed, that the marriage had in fact broken down, and they dissolved the marriages by khula. They also directed the return or surrender of dower, which is the usual consequence of khula.

Those decrees survived when the matters went before the Peshawar High Court. The wives, or the parties, then took the matter further, and it reached the Supreme Court as petitions for leave to appeal. The Supreme Court had to decide whether the route the Family Courts had taken — khula, imposed where cruelty was unproved but reconciliation had failed — was lawful and correct.

The Court's answer was no, not in that form. But its answer was not that the wives should remain trapped in broken marriages. Instead, the Court pointed to a different, lawful route that the Family Courts should have used: dissolution on the ground of shiqaq under section 2(ix) of the Dissolution of Muslim Marriages Act, 1939.

That distinction — between ending the marriage by khula and ending it by statutory dissolution — is the heart of the judgment, and it has real financial and social consequences. To understand it, we need to look at each remedy separately.

Khula and dissolution: two different doors

In everyday conversation, people often use "khula" and "divorce" interchangeably, as if they were the same thing. In law, they are not. They are two different doors out of a marriage, with different requirements and different consequences, and confusing them can cost a wife her dower.

Khula is a form of dissolution initiated by the wife, in which she seeks release from the marriage, usually by offering or returning consideration, most commonly the dower she received. In classical law and in Pakistani practice, khula involves the wife's election or consent: she asks to be released, and she gives up something in return, typically the haq mehr. That is why, in the cases before the Supreme Court, the Family Courts' decrees of khula carried a direction for the return or surrender of dower. That direction was not an accident. It follows from the nature of khula itself.

Dissolution under the Dissolution of Muslim Marriages Act, 1939, is different. The 1939 Act gives a Muslim wife the right to approach the court for dissolution on specified statutory grounds listed in section 2 of the Act. Those grounds include, among others, the husband's desertion, failure to maintain, imprisonment, impotency, insanity, and cruelty. If the court finds that a statutory ground is made out, it dissolves the marriage by decree. The wife does not, merely because the marriage is dissolved on a statutory ground, have to surrender her dower in the way she would on khula. Her right to dower is governed by the law of dower and by the terms of the nikahnama, not forfeited by the act of seeking dissolution.

The Supreme Court put the point sharply: khula and statutory dissolution are distinct remedies, and the distinction is "substantive, not merely semantic." In other words, calling one thing by the other's name is not a harmless labelling error. It changes the wife's rights. A wife who obtains dissolution under the Act keeps the legal position that the Act gives her. A wife who is put through khula gives up dower. If a court, with the best of intentions, converts a failed cruelty case into khula because the marriage has broken down, it may end the marriage but it also strips the wife of a right she never agreed to surrender.

That is why the Court said that failure to prove cruelty "does not authorise the court to manufacture an election of khula on behalf of the wife." The word "manufacture" is deliberate and strong. Khula requires the wife's own election. A court cannot invent that election for her merely because it feels sorry for her, or because it thinks the marriage is over, or because it wants to give her some relief rather than none. If the wife has not elected khula, the court cannot impose it on her.

This is also where the opening principle quoted at the start of this article comes from. A wife should not be judicially deprived of a lawful right — here, her dower — without the foundation of law and evidence. And a spouse should not be judicially burdened with a stigma — here, a finding or label that the evidence does not support — without that same foundation. The Court was protecting both sides: the wife's property right, and both parties' right not to be labelled by a finding the evidence does not justify.

What is shiqaq?

Shiqaq is an Arabic and Urdu legal term that is often translated as discord, marital strife, or a serious and continuing rupture between husband and wife. It does not mean a single quarrel, a bad week, or a disagreement that could be resolved with time and patience. It means a state of affairs in which the marital relationship has broken down so seriously and so persistently that the spouses cannot reasonably be expected to live together as husband and wife.

In the context of this judgment, shiqaq is not a vague feeling of unhappiness. It is a legal ground that must be proved with evidence. The Court held that a serious and continuing marital rupture — shiqaq — can be a ground for dissolution under section 2(ix) of the 1939 Act, even where cruelty is not proved. That is a significant clarification, because it gives wives in broken marriages a lawful route that does not depend on proving cruelty, and does not require them to surrender dower through khula.

Think of it this way. Cruelty asks: did the husband treat the wife cruelly, in the legal sense? Shiqaq asks a different question: has the marriage itself broken down irretrievably, with serious and continuing discord, so that the spouses cannot live together? A marriage can be broken in the second sense even if no single act of cruelty, as defined by law, can be proved against the husband. The spouses may have grown irreconcilably apart, may have lived separately for a long time, may have failed every attempt at reconciliation, and may be locked in persistent conflict that makes cohabitation impossible. That state of affairs, if proved, can itself justify dissolution.

The Court did not say that every unhappy marriage amounts to shiqaq. The rupture must be serious and continuing. A court will look at the whole picture: how long the discord has lasted, whether the parties live together or apart, whether reconciliation has been attempted and failed, whether there is persistent conflict, and whether there is any realistic prospect of the marriage being restored. The longer and more entrenched the breakdown, and the clearer the failure of reconciliation, the stronger the case for shiqaq.

This is an important protection for wives, but it is also a protection for husbands. Shiqaq does not brand the husband as cruel when cruelty has not been proved. It does not require the court to make a finding of fault that the evidence does not support. It ends the marriage on the ground that the marriage has broken down, not on the ground that one party is to blame in a way the law defines as cruelty. That neutrality is part of why the Court preferred this route.

What section 2(ix) covers

Section 2 of the Dissolution of Muslim Marriages Act, 1939, lists the grounds on which a woman married under Muslim law is entitled to obtain a decree for dissolution of her marriage. The earlier clauses deal with specific situations: the husband's whereabouts unknown for four years, failure to provide maintenance for two years, imprisonment for seven years or more, failure to perform marital obligations for three years, impotency, insanity, leprosy or venereal disease, cruelty, and so on. Section 2(ix) is the residuary clause. In plain language, it is the catch-all provision: it covers "any other ground which is recognised as valid for the dissolution of marriages under Muslim law."

That wording is deliberately broad, and that breadth is what made this case possible. The question was whether shiqaq falls within that residuary wording. The Supreme Court held that it does. A serious and continuing marital rupture, recognised in Muslim law as a basis for ending a marriage, can be invoked under section 2(ix), even if it does not fit neatly into one of the earlier, more specific clauses.

Residuary clauses are often misunderstood. They are not a licence for a court to dissolve a marriage for any reason it likes. The ground invoked must still be one that is "recognised as valid" under Muslim law. The Court therefore had to examine the classical and legal sources, the earlier case law, and the opinions of scholars and institutions, to decide whether shiqaq is such a recognised ground. Its conclusion was that it is, and that conclusion is now authoritative guidance for Family Courts across Pakistan.

The Court also addressed the history of this debate in Pakistani case law. It preferred the approach of the Lahore High Court larger bench in Mst. Balqis Fatima v. Najm-ul-Ikram Qureshi (PLD 1959 (W.P.) Lahore 566) over reservations expressed in the older case of Mt. Umar Bibi v. Mohammad Din (AIR 1945 Lahore 51). Readers do not need to master those old cases to understand the point, but the contrast matters: the Court chose the line of authority that gives fuller effect to the wife's statutory right to dissolution, rather than the more restrictive line that had cast doubt on it. In doing so, it settled a debate that had lingered for decades.

The Court also sought the opinion of the Council of Islamic Ideology on the question, while making clear that the decision remained the Court's. That step is worth noting, because it shows how the Court approached a question that sits at the intersection of statute and Islamic law. It consulted the Council, as a body with expertise in Islamic law, but it did not hand over its judicial function. The judgment is the Court's own, based on law and evidence, and the Council's opinion was sought as guidance, not as a substitute for judicial decision.

Why the dower consequence matters so much

For many wives, the most practical part of this judgment is not the Latin or Arabic terminology. It is the money. Dower — haq mehr — is often the only substantial financial security a wife has when a marriage ends. It may have been fixed at the time of nikah, it may be prompt or deferred, and it may be the sum she relies on to support herself and her children after dissolution.

On khula, the wife typically returns or surrenders the dower. That is the bargain at the heart of khula: release in exchange for consideration. On dissolution under the 1939 Act, the wife does not surrender dower merely because she sought dissolution. She retains her right to dower as provided by law and by the nikahnama, subject to any specific terms or defences in the individual case.

Now imagine a wife who sues for dissolution on cruelty, fails to prove cruelty, but has plainly lived in a broken marriage for years. If the court, trying to help, converts her case into khula, she walks out of the marriage but walks out without her dower. She loses the very financial protection that the law intended her to keep. She never asked for khula. She never agreed to give up her dower. Yet the court's well-meaning intervention has that exact effect.

The Supreme Court's ruling prevents that outcome. It says: do not manufacture khula. If the marriage has broken down through shiqaq, dissolve it under section 2(ix), and let the wife's dower rights follow the law of dissolution, not the law of khula. That single correction can be worth a great deal in real cases, and it is why lawyers and Family Court judges will be reading this judgment closely.

It is also why wives should be careful, when filing a suit, to plead their case correctly from the start, with legal help. A suit that only pleads cruelty, and says nothing about shiqaq, may leave the court with a narrower set of options. A suit that pleads cruelty in the alternative, and shiqaq under section 2(ix) as an additional or alternative ground, with evidence of serious and continuing discord, gives the court the lawful route the Supreme Court has now confirmed. Pleading in the alternative does not weaken a case. It strengthens it, by giving the court a lawful way to grant relief even if one ground fails.

Husbands, too, should understand the dower point. A husband who resists a wife's suit on the ground that cruelty is unproved cannot assume that the case must therefore fail, or that the wife will have to give up dower through khula. If shiqaq is proved, the marriage can still be dissolved, and the dower consequences will follow dissolution, not khula. A husband who wants to contest shiqaq must contest the breakdown itself: show that reconciliation is possible, that the discord is not serious or continuing, or that the evidence does not establish a rupture. Simply pointing to the failure of cruelty is no longer enough.

What proof a wife still needs for shiqaq

The judgment does not make dissolution automatic, and it does not lower the burden of proof to nothing. A wife who invokes shiqaq must still prove her case. The Court's ruling changes which ground can succeed, not whether evidence is needed. That distinction is essential, and anyone reading headlines that say "divorce now easier" should treat them with caution.

What, then, does a wife need to show? In practice, the evidence will usually cover several points, and a Family Court will weigh them together rather than treating any single fact as decisive:

  • Serious discord, not a single quarrel. The wife should be able to describe, with dates and examples, a pattern of persistent conflict, separation, or inability to live together, rather than one isolated argument. Witnesses, family members, or documentary evidence can support that picture.
  • Continuing rupture. The discord must be continuing, not temporary. Evidence that the parties have lived apart, have not resumed conjugal life, or have been unable to reconcile over a significant period will be relevant. The longer the rupture, the clearer the picture.
  • Failed reconciliation. Family Courts in Pakistan are required to attempt reconciliation, and the fact that reconciliation has been attempted and has failed is powerful evidence of shiqaq. In the cases before the Supreme Court, the failure of reconciliation was a central fact. A wife should therefore take the reconciliation process seriously, attend hearings, and keep a record of what was attempted.
  • No realistic prospect of restoration. The court will ask whether there is any real chance that the marriage can be saved. If both parties, or the evidence as a whole, show that restoration is not realistically possible, that supports a finding of shiqaq.
  • Corroboration. A wife's own statement is evidence, but it is stronger when supported by other material: statements of witnesses, records of separate residence, communications showing persistent discord, or prior proceedings between the parties. Courts are cautious about dissolving a marriage on an uncorroborated assertion alone, especially where the husband contests the claim.

A husband who disputes shiqaq can challenge each of these points. He can argue that the discord is recent or trivial, that the parties can still reconcile, that he is willing to resume marital life on reasonable terms, or that the wife's evidence is inconsistent or uncorroborated. The court must then decide, on the evidence as a whole, whether shiqaq is established.

It is also important to note what shiqaq does not require. It does not require proof of cruelty, adultery, or any other specific fault. It does not require the wife to prove that the husband is solely to blame. It requires proof that the marriage, as a living relationship, has broken down seriously and continuously. That is a different, and in many broken marriages more honest, question.

The procedure: Family Court, reconciliation, evidence

A suit for dissolution is filed in the Family Court that has jurisdiction over the parties, usually where the wife resides or where the marriage took place, subject to the rules of the Family Courts Act and the applicable procedure. The plaint should set out the grounds relied on, the facts supporting them, and the reliefs claimed, including maintenance, dower, and dowry articles where applicable. As noted above, pleading shiqaq under section 2(ix) alongside or in the alternative to cruelty is now clearly advisable, in light of this judgment.

After the suit is filed and the husband is served, the court follows a staged process. First, it attempts reconciliation between the parties, as the law requires. This is not a formality. The court, or a conciliator appointed for the purpose, meets the parties, explores whether the marriage can be saved, and records the outcome. If reconciliation succeeds, the suit may be withdrawn or dismissed as compromised. If it fails, the case proceeds to evidence.

In the evidence stage, the wife leads her evidence first, as the plaintiff, followed by the husband's evidence. Witnesses can be cross-examined. Documents, such as the nikahnama, medical records where relevant, records of separate residence, or prior court orders, can be exhibited. The court then hears arguments and delivers judgment. If it finds a ground made out, it passes a decree for dissolution. If it does not, it dismisses the suit, and the marriage subsists.

After a decree for dissolution, there are further steps. The decree must be made effective in accordance with the law, including the procedure for effectiveness of divorce under the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance, 1961, where applicable, and the Union Council process. The parties should take advice on those steps, because a court decree alone does not always complete every administrative formality. Maintenance, dower, and dowry articles, if decreed, must be enforced, and that may require execution proceedings if the husband does not pay voluntarily.

Appeals from a Family Court decree go through the appellate forum provided by law, and from there to the High Court and, on legal grounds, to the Supreme Court. The Zainab Bibi case itself travelled that long route, from Family Court through the Peshawar High Court to the Supreme Court. That journey took time, and it is a reminder that family litigation can be slow. Early legal advice, correct pleading, and complete evidence at the Family Court stage can save years of appeal.

Practical takeaways for wives

  • Plead shiqaq expressly. If your marriage has broken down, do not rely only on cruelty. Ask your lawyer to plead section 2(ix) and shiqaq, in the alternative if necessary, with facts showing serious and continuing discord and failed reconciliation.
  • Do not accept khula by default. If you have not elected khula, and you do not want to surrender your dower, say so clearly. A court cannot manufacture khula for you. If a decree of khula is proposed where you sought dissolution, ask your lawyer to draw the Court's attention to the Zainab Bibi judgment.
  • Protect your dower claim. Keep your nikahnama safe, note whether dower is prompt or deferred, and claim it expressly in your suit. Dower is a separate claim from dissolution, and it should not be lost by confusion between remedies.
  • Attend reconciliation honestly. Do not treat reconciliation as a hurdle to be rushed through. Attend, engage in good faith, and if reconciliation genuinely fails, make sure that failure is recorded. It is evidence for shiqaq.
  • Gather evidence of breakdown. Keep a simple, factual record of separation, persistent discord, and failed attempts to live together. Identify witnesses who can speak from personal knowledge, not merely from what you told them.
  • Claim maintenance and dowry articles separately. Dissolution does not automatically settle maintenance or dowry articles. Claim each relief expressly, with evidence, so that the decree covers them.

Practical takeaways for husbands

  • Do not assume failure of cruelty ends the case. After this judgment, a wife who fails on cruelty may still succeed on shiqaq. Contest the breakdown itself, not only the cruelty allegation.
  • Take reconciliation seriously. If you genuinely want to save the marriage, engage in the reconciliation process sincerely and make reasonable offers for resumption of marital life. A court will notice the difference between a genuine effort and a formal objection.
  • Challenge shiqaq on evidence. If you dispute that the marriage has broken down seriously and continuously, lead evidence: show cohabitation, show attempts at reconciliation that were refused without reason, or show that the discord is recent or remediable. Cross-examine the wife's witnesses on the specifics of the alleged rupture.
  • Understand the dower consequence. If the marriage is dissolved under the 1939 Act on shiqaq, the dower consequences will not be those of khula. Take advice on what that means for your financial position, rather than assuming the wife must surrender dower.
  • Do not use delay as a strategy without advice. Prolonging proceedings may seem advantageous, but it can also strengthen a shiqaq case, because continuing separation and continuing discord over time are themselves evidence of rupture. A strategy that drags out a broken marriage may prove the very ground it seeks to resist.
  • Consider settlement. In many family cases, a negotiated settlement — on dissolution, dower, maintenance, and custody, where children are involved — is faster, less costly, and less damaging than years of litigation. A lawyer can help explore whether settlement is possible without either side surrendering rights the law gives them.

Frequently asked questions

Does this ruling mean any wife can now get a divorce simply by saying the marriage has broken down? No. She must still prove shiqaq — a serious and continuing rupture — with evidence, and the court must be satisfied after hearing both sides and attempting reconciliation. The ruling adds a lawful ground; it does not remove the need for proof.

What is the difference between khula and dissolution under the 1939 Act, in one sentence? Khula is a wife-initiated release in which she typically surrenders dower; dissolution under the 1939 Act is a court decree on a statutory ground, such as shiqaq under section 2(ix), in which she does not surrender dower merely by seeking dissolution.

If cruelty is proved, should a wife still plead shiqaq? Pleading in the alternative is often wise. If cruelty is proved, the court can dissolve on cruelty. If it is not, the court can still consider shiqaq. Pleading both, where the facts support both, gives the court lawful options and protects the wife from being pushed into khula.

Can a husband also invoke shiqaq? The 1939 Act gives the wife the right to seek dissolution on the grounds in section 2. A husband's remedies for ending a marriage are different — principally talaq, subject to the law and procedure governing it — and this judgment is about the wife's statutory right. A husband facing a shiqaq suit should contest it on its own terms, as described above.

Does this ruling affect the iddat period or maintenance? The ruling itself is about the ground for dissolution and the distinction from khula. Iddat, maintenance during and after dissolution, and related rights continue to be governed by their own legal rules and by the decree in the individual case. Take advice on those points separately.

Is the Council of Islamic Ideology's opinion binding on the Court? No. The Court sought the Council's opinion as guidance on a question involving Islamic law, but it made clear that the decision remained the Court's. The judgment is a judicial decision, not a Council opinion.

Why this judgment matters

The Zainab Bibi judgment matters for three reasons that go beyond the two marriages it decided.

First, it protects wives from losing dower by accident. For decades, the confusion between khula and dissolution has quietly cost wives money they were entitled to keep. By insisting that the distinction is substantive, not semantic, and that a court cannot manufacture khula, the Supreme Court has closed a trap that caught wives who were already in the painful position of ending a marriage.

Second, it gives the law a more honest vocabulary for broken marriages. Not every broken marriage involves cruelty that can be proved to a court's satisfaction. Some marriages end because trust, communication, and the ability to live together have collapsed over time. The law should have a way to recognise that reality without forcing a wife to prove fault she cannot prove, or to brand a husband with a finding the evidence does not support. Shiqaq under section 2(ix) provides that vocabulary.

Third, it reaffirms a basic principle of justice that applies far beyond family law: a court should not deprive a person of a lawful right, or burden a person with a stigma, without law and evidence. That principle, stated at the opening of the judgment, is a check on well-meaning but unlawful shortcuts. A court that wants to help a wife in a broken marriage must help her through a lawful route, not by inventing a consent she never gave.

For wives, husbands, lawyers, and Family Court judges, the practical message is clear. Plead the right ground, prove it with evidence, respect the reconciliation process, and keep khula and dissolution distinct. The Supreme Court has now shown the lawful path when cruelty is not proved but the marriage is over. It is for the parties and their lawyers to walk it correctly, case by case, on the evidence of each marriage.

This article provides general legal information about a reported Supreme Court judgment. It is not legal advice for any specific case. Family law, dower, maintenance, and procedure can differ by individual circumstances, and the law in this area continues to develop. If you are considering dissolution, khula, or any family-law step, consult a qualified family lawyer for advice on your own situation.